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Abstract
Background: A central objective of recent U.S. healthcare policy reform, most notably the Affordable Care Act’s
(ACA) Health Insurance Marketplace, has been to increase access to stable, affordable health insurance. However, changing
market dynamics (rising premiums, changes in issuer participation and plan availability) raise significant concerns about the
marketplaces’ ability to provide a stable source of healthcare for Americans that rely on them. By looking at the effect of
instability on changes in the consumer choice set, we can analyze potential incentives to switch plans among
price-sensitive enrollees, which can then be used to inform policy going forward.
Methods: Data on health plan features for non-tobacco users in 2512 counties in 34 states participating in
federally-facilitated exchanges from 2014 to 2016 was obtained from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare
Services. We examined how changes in individual plan features, including premiums, deductibles, issuers, and
plan types, impact consumers who had purchased the lowest-cost silver or bronze plan in their county the
previous year. We calculated the cost of staying in the same plan versus switching to another plan the following year,
and analyzed how costs vary across geographic regions.
Results: In most counties in 2015 and 2016 (53.7 and 68.2%, respectively), the lowest-cost silver plan from the previous
year was still available, but was no longer the cheapest plan. In these counties, consumers who switched to the new
lowest-cost plan would pay less in monthly premiums on average, by $51.48 and $55.01, respectively, compared to
staying in the same plan. Despite potential premium savings from switching, however, the majority would still pay
higher average premiums compared to the previous year, and most would face higher deductibles and an
increased probability of having to change provider networks.
Conclusion: While the ACA has shown promise in expanding healthcare access, continued changes in the availability
and affordability of health plans are likely to result in churning and switching among enrollees, which may
have negative ramifications for their health going forward. Future healthcare policy reform should aim to stabilize marketplace
dynamics in order to encourage greater care continuity and limit churning.
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Background
A central objective of recent healthcare policy reform in
the United States has been to make coverage more secure
and to extend affordable health insurance to those who
were previously uninsured or only covered intermittently
[1]. The Health Insurance Marketplace, established under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in
2014, is the most notable example of such a policy initia-
tive. However, rising premium costs, changes in plan avail-
ability, and changes in issuer participation (in particular
issuers leaving the market) have been observed over the
first 3 years, which raises some concerns about the stabil-
ity of the Marketplace, in particular how these changes
affect the health plan choices available to consumers.
Adding further to the concerns about whether the ACA
policy initiatives can actually achieve their stated objec-
tives is the possibility that the healthcare law could be
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repealed or replaced under the current Republication ad-
ministration, although legislation to repeal the ACA has
stalled as of March 2017, and it is uncertain whether it will
be revived.
Despite the uncertainty about the future of the ACA
and the health insurance marketplaces, understanding
the effect of changing market dynamics since 2014 on
the choice set of plans available to consumers can offer
valuable insight for the development of future policy ini-
tiatives that aim to provide health insurance coverage on
a national scale. Using publicly available health plan data
for all 2512 counties in the 34 states participating in the
federally-facilitated insurance marketplaces we examined
changes in premiums, medical deductibles, issuers and
plan types, and issuer participation over time, including
how the available set of health plans, and their respective
characteristics, affect potential incentives to switch plans
among price sensitive enrollees. In addition, we analyzed
variation in the cost of staying in the same plan from
the previous year versus switching to the new cheapest
plan offered in the county in order to assess whether
and to what extent geographic differences existed.
Overview of the ACA marketplace and other health
insurance systems
In the United States, the ACA Health Insurance Market-
place was designed to be a competitive, organized health
insurance market (comprised of health insurance ex-
changes administered either by the federal government
or by individual states) where consumers could easily
comparison-shop and buy insurance based on price,
benefit design, and cost-sharing, either online, by phone,
or with in-person help at designated locations. Individ-
uals with access to affordable coverage are also required
to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty; those
without access to affordable coverage, for whom the
lowest-cost bronze plan would cost more than 8% of
their income, are exempt from the penalty. In 2016, the
penalty was the greater of $695 per person or 2.5% of in-
come. There is a yearly period when individuals can en-
roll in a health insurance plan, or switch to a different
plan. Open enrollment is also a feature of many health
systems in Europe that underwent significant healthcare
reform in the 1990s, including in Switzerland (biannual
enrollment windows), the Netherlands (annual), Germany
(first annual, now monthly), and Belgium (quarterly) [2–5].
ACA health insurance plans are designed to be actu-
arially equivalent, and are classified into four “metal
levels” based on the percentage of health care costs that
are covered for the average enrollee: bronze (60% of
costs covered by insurance), silver (70%), gold (80%) and
platinum (90%); under this design bronze plans, for ex-
ample, have the lowest premiums, but the highest ex-
pected out-of-pocket costs. Out of pocket costs may
include large deductibles (which can exceed $6000 per
person for bronze plans) in addition to copayments and
coinsurance. In contrast, the compulsory national health
insurance plan in Belgium, for example, covers major
health risks (including inpatient and long-term care) for
the entire population, while in Germany a minimum
benefit package is required but the insured are expected
to pay co-payments for certain services, such as prescrip-
tion drugs and hospital stays [6].
ACA plan premiums are established on the basis of a
modified community rating system, wherein they are
only allowed to vary on the basis of four factors: geo-
graphic region, family size, age, and tobacco use. Pre-
miums for each age are based on a schedule of fixed
ratios determined by a standardized age curve, such that
premiums for a 64-year-old are three times greater than
those for a 21-year-old; most plans follow the federally
established age curve, with the exception of four states
and the District of Columbia, who have established their
own age curves. Variation in ACA plan features such as
premiums and medical deductibles is quite large, how-
ever, and even plans with the same actuarial value are
likely valued differently by individuals depending on ex-
pectations for their healthcare needs. High premium
variability has also been shown in empirical studies of
health systems in Europe, such as those in Belgium and
Switzerland [2, 3].
Premium subsidies
Households with incomes between 100 and 400% of the
federal poverty level (FPL) are also eligible for subsidies,
which are determined on the basis of income level and
the premium cost of the silver plan with the
second-lowest premium (the “benchmark” plan) in the
county, such that the benchmark plan can be purchased
with a fixed percentage of income. In a previous paper
by Graetz, Kaplan and others [7], the example of an in-
dividual earning an income that was 200% of the FPL
($23,340) in 2014 was used to demonstrate subsidy cal-
culations – this individual would be able to purchase the
benchmark plan using 6.3% of their income, or $123 per
month. For a benchmark plan with a monthly premium
of $300, the subsidy would be equal to the difference in
this market cost of the plan and the amount the individ-
ual would pay per month based on the fixed income
threshold, or $177 per month. Similar calculations can
be performed for any income between 100 and 400% of
the FPL, with the exception of the case where a bench-
mark plan has a premium cost that is at or below the in-
come threshold ($123 in the previous example), where
no subsidy would be received (see Graetz, Kaplan et al.
2014 for additional details on subsidy calculations). It is
also important to note that the subsidy received can be
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used to purchase any plan in the Marketplace, including
the lowest-cost silver plan and the less expensive bronze
plans. Approximately 19 and 20% of consumers enrolled
in lowest-cost silver plans and bronze plans, respectively,
in each year of the Marketplace.
Changes in the marketplace
Understanding how Marketplace stability affects the af-
fordability of health plans and the choices that con-
sumers have (including how relative costs of plans
impact incentives to switch), is of particular importance.
In a previous study, we analyzed the impact of rising
premiums on affordability [8]. In this study, we focused
our analysis on the effect of changing market dynamics
on the set of health plans (and their respective charac-
teristics, in particular their relative costs) available to
individuals seeking low-cost healthcare.
Methods
Data
We obtained publicly available data on the characteris-
tics of health plans and plan availability (including
issuers and plan types) for non-tobacco users in all 2512
counties in the 34 states participating in the
federally-facilitated exchanges for 2014–2016 from the
Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS).
Tobacco users were excluded from this analysis since
they may face up to a 50% increase in premiums due to
the tobacco surcharges. We used crosswalk files pro-
vided by CMS to link plans between 2014 and 2015 and
between 2015 and 2016 in order to examine how specific
plan features changed from year to year as well as to de-
termine which plans were discontinued [https://data.-
healthcare.gov]. Counties were chosen as the unit of
analysis since rating areas are generally based on
county lines.
Although we cannot actually observe enrollment
choices at the county level or for specific plans within a
metal tier level due to data limitations, we can observe
the set of plans, and their respective characteristics, that
are available to consumers. Individuals facing reenroll-
ment decisions for plans that continued the following
year were also affected by rising premiums: over half of
silver plans that had been the lowest-cost initially (in
2014 or 2015) were no longer the cheapest option in the
subsequent year (2015 or 2016). These consumers had
to consider whether to stay in their current plan and
possibly face higher premiums or switch to a different
plan. By looking at changes in the consumer choice set,
we can analyze potential incentives to switch plans.
The primary analysis in this paper centers on silver
plans, since they are the most popular. Due to the ab-
sence of county-level enrollment data, however, we also
examined changes in bronze plan features in order to
provide the most representative picture of market stabil-
ity (see Appendix for bronze plan results). We chose to
specifically focus on the lowest-cost silver and bronze
plans for two main reasons. First, since consumers tend
to prioritize monthly premiums over other plan features
when choosing a health insurance plan [9, 10], the
lowest-cost bronze and silver plans were likely appealing
entry-level and middle-level plans for enrollees who
qualify for premium and cost-sharing subsidies. Thus,
we expected these individuals to be more price sensitive
(i.e. most likely to be affected by the trend of rising pre-
miums) than those enrolled in gold or platinum plans,
and consequently more likely to need to switch plans to
maintain affordable coverage. Second, nearly 70% of all
purchased Marketplace plans have been silver plans in
each year since the exchanges were established [11–13].
This is partly due to many low-income consumers being
eligible for cost-sharing reductions (discounts applied to
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance), but only if
they enroll in silver plans [14, 15].
We analyzed how changes in individual plan pre-
miums and other plan features affected incentives for
consumers aged 27, 50, and 60 who faced a reenrollment
decision, including both subsidy-eligible (incomes at or
below 400% of the FPL) and non-subsidy-eligible (in-
comes over 400% of the FPL) individuals. These specific
ages were chosen to provide a representative picture of
the impact on consumers in different age ranges, which
is important since age is one of the four factors by which
insurance premiums can vary.
Cost of staying
Since we were not able to observe actual stay vs. switch
decisions, we considered the potential reenrollment op-
tions that consumers in the lowest-cost silver plan could
encounter in the subsequent year. Such consumers
would face one of three possible scenarios – their ori-
ginal plan would: (1) remain the lowest-cost silver plan
in the county; (2) be offered, but no longer be the
lowest-cost; or (3) be discontinued. Individuals enrolled
in 2014 or 2015 plans who did not actively select a new
plan were, by default, enrolled in the linked 2015 or
2016 plan, while those enrolled in a plan that was dis-
continued were automatically disenrolled and would not
have coverage unless they actively selected a new plan.
“Active” re-enrollees are individuals who returned to the
Marketplace to select a new plan or to actively renew
their existing plan [14].
Using available health plan data, we constructed a
series of “scenarios” facing consumers. For both sets of
years (2014–15, 2015–16), we identified the lowest-cost
silver plan in the baseline year (2014 or 2015) for each
county. We then determined the status of each plan the
following year (2015 or 2016) and the subsequent impact
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on hypothetical reenrollment decisions. We categorized
plans that were discontinued as “Switch Only,” since in-
dividuals enrolled in those plans would have to choose a
new plan to maintain coverage. Plans that remained the
lowest-cost option were categorized as “Stay Only,” since
there would be no premium savings by switching plans;
while these individuals could still face higher year-over--
year premiums, their plan was still the cheapest com-
pared to all other silver plans in the county. The
changes in plan features for the “Stay Only” and “Switch
Only” plans are shown in Table 1, along with the num-
ber of counties that would have experienced these two
scenarios each time period. For plans that were no lon-
ger the cheapest option, consumers could either stay in
the same plan (“Choice to Stay”) or save money in
monthly premiums by switching to the new lowest-cost
plan (“Choice to Switch”). The changes in plan features
for this third scenario (for both the “Choice to Stay” and
“Choice to Switch” options) are shown in Table 2, along
with the number of counties that would experienced this
scenario each time period. Finally, the cost of staying
was calculated by taking the difference in the
after-subsidy premium cost between staying in the same
plan or switching to the new lowest-cost plan. Cost of
staying results are shown in Table 3 for subsidy-eligible
individuals (using 300% of the FPL as an example) and
those not eligible for subsidies (> 400% of the FPL), and
for all three potential scenarios. As long as an enrollee is
receiving a subsidy, the incremental cost of staying or
switching would be the same; we confirmed this by
conducting additional robustness calculations for
subsidy-eligible income levels at 200 and 400% FPL (not
shown in the table for simplification purposes).
Analysis
To examine geographic variation in the cost of staying
in the same plan in both sets of years (2014 to 2015,
2015 to 2016), we created maps showing the cost of
staying in the same plan year-over-year for every county
in the 34 states participating in the federally-facilitated
exchanges. The maps represent cost of staying for a
60-year-old at 300% of the FPL; as noted above, findings
are similar across income levels for subsidy-eligible
individuals, and given the fact that the impact of
changes to older individuals is greater due to the
structure of the age curves, we chose a 60-year-old
as the example to present more interesting results.
All maps were generated using QGIS, version 2.0.1
(Creative Commons). To illustrate changes in plan
features at the county level we summarized changes
in premiums, medical deductible amounts, issuers
and plan types; all computations were conducted
using Stata software, version 13.1 (StataCorp), and
were performed for each age (27, 50, and 60) and
income level, for all counties in the 34 states with
federally-facilitated exchanges, and for both sets of
years, unless otherwise specified.
Table 1 Changes to lowest-cost silver plan features: “Stay Only”
and “Switch Only”
2014–2015 2015–2016 2014–2016
Stay Only N = 987
(39.3%)
N = 641
(25.5%)
N = 365
(14.5%)
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
7.7% 13.3% 18.4%
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
$41.00 $76.50 $105.77
Counties with Premium
Increase (%)
90.3% 92.2% 95.1%
Counties with Premium
Decrease (%)
9.7% 7.8% 4.9%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
-$1.82 -$148.36 -$234.04
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
−0.1% −4.1% −5.9%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with No
Change (%)
99.9%† 90.6%†† 60.5%
2014-2015 2015–2016 2014–2016
Switch Only N = 175
(7.0%)
N = 159
(6.3%)
N = 352
(14.0%)
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
23.3% 21.5% 25.7%
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
$120.43 $110.88 $133.15
Counties with Premium
Increase (%)
93.1% 100.0% 98.0%
Counties with Premium
Decrease (%)
6.9% 0.0% 2.0%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
$1271.71 $133.33 $525.43
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
52.5% 4.4% 20.3%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with No
Change (%)
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
†For those who stay in the 2014 plan, the % of counties that did not retain the
same issuer and plan type is due to one lowest-cost silver plan type changing
from an HMO to a PPO in one county in Georgia
††For those who stay in the 2015 plan, the % of counties that did not retain
the same issuer and plan type is due to Aetna Health Inc. acquiring Coventry
Health Care Inc. in counties in Iowa (40) and North Carolina (13). Members did
not experience significant changes in care, and all provider locations remained
open after the change. The issuer and plan type serve as a proxy for provider
network. Further, there were 10 counties in Pennsylvania where the issuer was
different in the following year, based on the information from the crosswalk
file used to link 2015 and 2016 plans
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Results
Geographic variation in the cost of staying
Figure 1 and Fig. 2 show geographic variation in the cost of
staying in the same plan versus switching to a different plan
in 2015 or 2016 for consumers previously enrolled in the
lowest-cost silver plan. The lightest areas represent the 39.3
and 25.5% of counties where the lowest-cost silver plan
remained the lowest-cost in 2015 and 2016, respectively.
Since consumers enrolled in these plans had no cheaper
option in terms of premiums when facing reenrollment,
there was no cost ($0) to staying in the same plan. It is im-
portant to note that a $0 cost to staying does not necessar-
ily mean that the plan’s year-over-year premium did not
change, just that switching to any other silver plan in the
county would not save the consumer any money. The grad-
uated colors of light pink to dark red indicate that in most
counties in 2015 (53.7%) and 2016 (68.2%), the previous
year’s lowest-cost silver plan was still available, but no lon-
ger offered the lowest premium. In these counties, the aver-
age monthly premium cost of staying for a 60-year-old was
$51.48 ($0.00–$315.14) in 2015, and $55.01 ($0–$322.60)
in 2016. In the remaining counties (7.0% in 2015 and 6.3%
in 2016), the lowest-cost silver plan was discontinued
(black). Although we only show the cost of staying for a
60-year-old at 300% FPL, the geographic pattern was simi-
lar across all ages and income levels (both subsidy-eligible
at below 400% FPL, and non-subsidy-eligible at greater
than 400%) for both sets of years.
The average cost of staying is also shown in Table 3
for both subsidy-eligible and non-subsidy-eligible con-
sumers. For plans that remained the lowest-cost, the
cost of staying was $0, since all other plans offered were
more expensive in comparison, while the “cost” for indi-
viduals whose plan was discontinued was no coverage
the following year. In counties where the lowest-cost sil-
ver plan from the previous year was still available, but
was no longer the cheapest, the cost of staying in 2015
and 2016 was an additional $51.48 and $55.01 in monthly
premiums, on average.
Changes in silver plan features and availability
Table 1 shows changes in silver plan features for the
“Stay Only” and “Switch Only” scenarios, while changes
for consumers faced with either “Choice to Stay” or
“Choice to Switch” are shown in Table 2. In general, al-
though average premiums for the lowest-cost silver plans
increased on average between 2014 and 2015, they rose
by approximately the same percentage (7.7 and 7.1%, re-
spectively) regardless of whether that plan remained the
cheapest option or not. However, between 2015 and
2016, not only did average premiums increase by a larger
percentage than in the previous time period, premiums
for silver plans that were no longer the cheapest in-
creased by significantly more (19.9%) than those that
remained the cheapest option (13.3%) year-over-year.
“Stay Only” and “Switch Only” Plans
Table 1 indicates that consumers almost always had a
higher premium year-over-year regardless of whether
their initial silver plan remained the lowest-cost or if
their plan was discontinued. For instance, over the
three-year time period average monthly premiums for
plans that remained the cheapest increased by 18.4%
and premiums became higher in 95.1% of counties,
while premiums for residents of counties where their
2014 was discontinued by 2016 increased by 25.7% on
average, even under the assumption that these con-
sumers switched to the new lowest-cost silver plan
in the county. However, opposite effects were ob-
served for the medical deductibles: while individuals
whose plan was discontinued faced an average in-
crease in their annual deductible of $525.43 between
2014 and 2016, those whose plan remained the
cheapest actually experienced a decrease of $234.04.
Table 2 Changes to lowest-cost silver plan features: “Choice to Stay” vs. “Choice to Switch”
2014–2015
N = 1350 (53.7%)
2015–2016
N = 1712 (68.2%)
2014–2016
N = 1795 (71.5%)
Choice to Stay Choice to Switch Choice to Stay Choice to Switch Choice to Stay Choice to Switch
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-Year Change (%) 7.1% −1.5% 19.9% 10.7% 27.4% 13.5%
Avg. Year-Over-Year Change ($) $42.31 -$9.18 $118.09 $63.08 $156.37 $77.08
Counties with Premium Increase (%) 87.2% 49.9% 97.0% 81.5% 95.3% 82.0%
Counties with Premium Decrease (%) 12.8% 50.1% 3.0% 18.5% 4.7% 18.0%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-Year Change ($) $52.52 -$42.52 -$515.01 $369.93 -$541.67 $347.21
Avg. Year-Over-Year Change (%) 1.6% −1.3% −14.3% 10.3% −15.1% 9.7%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with No Change (%) 99.1% 25.1% 88.3% 36.8% 36.2% 5.1%
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In contrast, individuals with employer-sponsored
plans experienced an increase in their annual de-
ductible between 2014 and 2016 (by approximately
$261, on average), in addition to increases in pre-
miums [16, 17].
Thus, for consumers whose plan remained the cheap-
est, rising premiums may not always indicate a worsen-
ing situation – those with concurrent decreases in their
deductible may have been better off from these changes.
However, by 2016 silver plans remained the lowest-cost
in all 3 years in only 14.5% of counties. Overall, only
1.6% of counties had plans that remained the cheapest
and had decreases in deductibles between 2014 and
2016. For consumers whose plans were discontinued,
the average year-over-year change in deductible for
2015–2016 was much less than the change observed
for 2014–2015 ($133.33 vs. $1271.71, respectively).
However, the fact remains that these consumers still
faced increases in both premiums and deductibles
over the 3 years.
Table 3 Changes in after-subsidy premiums for lowest-cost silver plans
With Subsidy at 300% FPL
2014–2015 2015–2016
Change in Premium Cost of Stayinga Change in Premium Cost of Stayinga
Stay Switch Difference Stay Switch Difference
Remained Lowest-Cost N = 987 counties N = 641 counties
27-year-old $14.51 $0.00 $19.73 $0.00
50-year-old $8.07 $0.00 -$0.44 $0.00
60-year-old $9.33 $0.00 -$0.80 $0.00
No Longer Lowest-Cost N = 1350 counties N = 1712 counties
27-year-old $19.04 -$1.00 $20.04 $38.98 $17.55 $21.43
50-year-old $37.10 $3.11 $33.99 $36.37 $0.04 $36.33
60-year-old $54.89 $3.41 $51.48 $54.95 -$0.06 $55.01
Discontinued N = 175 counties N = 159 counties
27-year-old $46.50 No Coverage $37.04 No Coverage
50-year-old -$1.17 No Coverage $2.27 No Coverage
60-year-old -$3.06 No Coverage $1.98 No Coverage
No Subsidy at > 400% FPL
2014–2015 2015–2016
Change in Premium Cost of Staying Change in Premium Cost of Staying
Stay Switch Difference Stay Switch Difference
Remained Lowest-Cost N = 987 counties N = 641 counties
27-year-old $15.84 $0.00 $29.54 $0.00
50-year-old $26.99 $0.00 $50.34 $0.00
60-year-old $41.00 $0.00 $76.50 $0.00
No Longer Lowest-Cost N = 1350 counties N = 1712 counties
27-year-old $16.50 -$3.54 $20.04 $45.89 $24.46 $21.43
50-year-old $27.95 -$6.04 $33.99 $77.90 $41.58 $36.33
60-year-old $42.31 -$9.18 $51.49 $118.09 $63.08 $55.01
Discontinued N = 175 counties N = 159 counties
27-year-old $46.50 No Coverage $43.64 No Coverage
50-year-old $79.25 No Coverage $73.51 No Coverage
60-year-old $120.43 No Coverage $110.88 No Coverage
aPremium levels shown for nonusers of tobacco only. Cost of staying is the difference in the change in monthly after-subsidy silver premium between the linked
plan and the lowest-cost option. For those who switched, both the silver plans were lowest-cost. For those who stayed, only the 2014 or 2015 silver plan was
lowest-cost. Finally, in counties where the silver plan was discontinued, if enrollees did not actively select a new plan, they would no longer have coverage.
Calculations were the same between 2015 and 2016
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Fig. 1 Geographic Variation in the Cost of Staying in a Silver Plan: 2014–2015. Areas with diagonal lines, labeled “No Data,” represent states that
did not participate in federally-facilitated exchanges (i.e. have state marketplaces). The cost of staying was calculated as the difference between:
the change between the monthly after-subsidy premium of the 2014 silver plan and the linked 2015 plan, and the change between the 2014
plan and the lowest-cost silver plan in 2015. Black represents counties where the 2014 lowest-cost silver plan was discontinued in 2015. Computed
costs of staying apply to a 60-year-old
Fig. 2 Geographic Variation in the Cost of Staying in a Silver Plan: 2015–2016. Areas with diagonal lines, labeled “No Data,” represent states that
did not participate in federally-facilitated exchanges (i.e. have state marketplaces). The cost of staying was calculated as the difference between:
the change between the monthly after-subsidy premium of the 2015 silver plan and the linked 2016 plan, and the change between the 2015
plan and the lowest-cost silver plan in 2016. Black represents counties where the 2015 lowest-cost silver plan was discontinued in 2016. Computed
costs of staying apply to a 60-year-old
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“Choice to Stay” vs. “Choice to Switch” Plans
Table 2 indicates that in both sets of years more than
half of silver plans that were lowest-cost initially were
no longer the cheapest option in the subsequent year
(53.7% of counties in 2015, and 68.2% in 2016). Fur-
ther, over the entire three-year time period, almost
three-quarters of lowest-cost silver plans that contin-
ued to be offered were no longer the cheapest option
(71.% of counties from 2014 to 2016). Enrollees in
these plans had the option to (1) stay in the plan or
(2) switch to a new plan.
2014–2015
Consumers whose 2014 silver plan was no longer the
lowest-cost and who chose to stay in that plan would en-
counter a year-over-year increase in premiums of 7.1%
on average, and premium increases occurred in 87.2% of
counties. However, by switching to the new lowest-cost
plan, these individuals could save money in average
monthly premiums both comparatively and year-over-
year (see Table 3), and would have a slightly lower
deductible (decrease of $42.52 annually). Despite the po-
tential premium savings, consumers who switched would
also likely have to change providers or networks: in only
25.1% of counties would the new lowest-cost silver plan
have the same issuer and plan type as the consumer’s
2014 plan.
2015–2016
Consumers whose 2015 silver plan was no longer the
lowest-cost and who chose to stay in that plan would en-
counter a year-over-year increase in premiums of 19.9%
on average, a substantially higher increase compared to
the previous time period; further, premium increases oc-
curred in almost all counties (97.0%). In addition, while
consumers who chose to switch to the new lowest-cost
silver plan in 2016 could save money relative to staying
in their 2015 plan (see Table 3), they would still face an
average 10.7% increase in premiums relative to what
they paid in 2015, and, unlike 2015, would experience an
average increase in their annual deductible of approxi-
mately $370. The increased likelihood of having to
switch providers or networks remained high, but was
somewhat less of a potential issue compared to the pre-
vious time period: the issuer and plan type remained the
same upon switching in 36.8% of counties in 2016.
2014–2016
Over the three-year time period, average premiums for
silver plans that were lowest-cost in 2014 but were not
in 2016 increased by 27.4%, while those that remained
the lowest-cost option increased by 18.4%. Overall, even
if consumers switched to the cheapest plan in both sets
of years, they would still encounter an average increase
of 13.5% in premiums and a change of approximately
$350 in their average deductible (in only 11.0% of coun-
ties did plans that continued but were no longer the
cheapest have decreases in deductibles between 2014
and 2016). Additionally, the issuer and plan type were
only the same in 5.1% of counties.
Discussion
Between 2014 and 2016, average Marketplace health
plan premiums increased across most of the country
[18]. Premiums for the lowest-cost silver plan increased
by approximately 3.0% in 2015, and 10.5% in 2016 [19].
Additionally, in 7.0 and 6.3% of counties the lowest-cost
silver plan was discontinued the following year (2015
and 2016, respectively), in many cases due to an issuer
exiting the market entirely. These changes in plan avail-
ability led to disruption in coverage for many consumers
[20]; such individuals would actively need to choose a
new plan in order to maintain health insurance coverage.
Some evidence for churning (i.e. plan switching) does exist
at the state level (the most specific level of data that is
publicly available): among consumers in a 2014 plan that
continued to be offered on the federally-facilitated
exchanges in 2015, approximately 53% were active
re-enrollees, and of those, more than half (54%) switched
plans [12]. These proportions increased to approximately
70 and 61%, respectively, in 2016 [13].
We analyzed changes in health plan features and plan
availability over the first 3 years of the Health Insurance
Marketplace, and found that in over half of all counties
the lowest-cost silver plan was no longer the cheapest
option the following year, and only 14.5% remained the
lowest cost after 2 years (from 2014 to 2016). Although
the majority of consumers could save money by switching,
they would still pay higher average premiums year-over-year,
and most would face higher deductibles and an increased
probability of having to change provider networks. Even
though specific cost-sharing features of plans may change
year-over-year, since Marketplace metal levels are defined by
their actuarial value (the average share of health costs cov-
ered taking into account all plan features such as deductibles
and copayments), the average out-of-pocket costs for most
should be about the same for all plans within a metal level
[15]. There may be additional concerns regarding disruption
in coverage for consumers due to issuers exiting the Market-
place (about 6–7% of issuers of lowest-cost silver plans left
the market each year).
Continued premium growth
Our analysis found that in counties where a different silver
plan became the new cheapest option in 2015, the average
premium of that new lowest-cost silver plan decreased
slightly across years. In contrast, increases in average pre-
miums were observed for all silver plans that continued in
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2016, not just for those that were no longer the lowest-cost
(Table 2). This suggests there were new entrants to the
market that drove down prices in 2015 but not in 2016,
since premiums increased steadily regardless of whether
the plan remained the lowest-cost. Overall, even if con-
sumers switched to the cheapest plan in both sets of years,
they would still encounter an average increase of 13.5% in
premiums between 2014 and 2016. Further, the 7.7% in-
crease in premiums in 2015 was nearly double that of
employer-sponsored plans in 2015, and the 13.3% in-
crease in 2016 was more than four times that of
employer-sponsored plans in 2016 [16, 21]. This suggests
that a number of plans were underpriced in the first year
of the Marketplace. In fact, according to the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), 2014 ACA premiums for the bench-
mark plan were approximately 15% lower than expected
[22], thus, the pattern of increasing premiums could at
least in part be due to the market correcting for the initial
too low pricing strategies by insurers.
A more in-depth exploration into the dynamics of com-
petition in the Marketplace is a possible direction for fu-
ture work, such as analyses related to insurers pricing
strategies. For instance, a new lowest-cost plan in the mar-
ket could be the result of market competition working ef-
ficiently such that the new plan represents some type of
equilibrium, or the result of an insurer entering the mar-
ket with the objective of underbidding all other insurers in
an effort to gain market share. It’s likely that more detailed
financial data on insurers and more years of data of the
existence of the Marketplace would be needed in order to
determine which case, if either, was the correct one.
Plan discontinuation
Although the percentage of counties where the issuer of
the lowest-cost silver plan left the market in 2015 or 2016
was fairly small (~ 7.5%), in both sets of years our analysis
indicated substantially higher premiums and deductibles
for the new lowest-cost silver plan in these counties. Is-
suer/plan departure from counties or entire states could
result in significant disruption of coverage for consumers,
since they are automatically disenrolled. The failure of sev-
eral nonprofit health insurance co-ops is one reason for is-
suer exit from the Marketplace; by 2016, more than half
of the original ACA co-ops were no longer operating due
to lack of profitability [20]. Many of these co-ops that ul-
timately failed were approved despite warnings about
weaknesses in their business plans from third-party ana-
lysts, such as Deloitte Consulting LLP [23].
How changes in plan features may impact consumer
decision-making
Although not the only consideration for consumers, plan
premiums have been shown to be an important factor in
decisions to purchase health insurance [9, 24, 25]; thus, ris-
ing premiums for silver plans may promote plan switching
by increasing the likelihood that consumers will feel the
need to comparison-shop each year to find an affordable
health plan. An important implication of switching plans is
the increased likelihood of having to change provider net-
works. Results from our analysis indicated that residents of
most counties who could save money by switching plans in
2015 and 2016 would no longer have the same issuer (~ 75
and 63% of counties, respectively), which may increase the
probability of having to switch providers. The ability to
keep the same provider is often a key factor when choosing
a plan and is associated with higher care quality [9, 10].
Thus, despite potential premium savings, frequent plan
switching could limit long-term continuity of care.
On the other hand, Marketplace consumers are more
likely to have been previously uninsured [26], and indi-
viduals without dependable health insurance coverage
tend to have lower health literacy [9, 27, 28] and less ex-
perience navigating the health care system [28]; thus, al-
though the option to switch plans on an annual basis is
beneficial for consumers, the specific population tar-
geted by the ACA may find the task of re-evaluating
their purchase decisions year after year to be particularly
challenging, which may limit plan switching. The com-
plexity of insurance choices in addition to uncertainty
about future healthcare utilization may contribute to in-
ertia in health insurance decisions [29, 30].
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show that the cost of staying can vary
significantly by geographic region, suggesting heterogeneity
in monthly premium changes and possible geographic dif-
ferences in the likelihood of switching plans. For example,
in 2016, a 60-year-old living in Summit County, Utah in
2015 could save approximately $323 per month (or $3876
per year) if she switched to the new lowest-cost silver plan,
whereas a 60-year-old resident in any county in Delaware
would have no cost incentive to switch. Additional inter-
pretation would benefit from adding county-level demo-
graphic and socioeconomic data (including enrollment
data, if possible) to the CMS dataset, since it is possible that
some other systematic factors at the county level (e.g. pro-
portion of racial/ethnic minorities, rural vs. urban area)
may influence consumers’ incentives to switch plans, the
trade-offs involved or insurer’s decisions to stay or leave the
marketplaces.
Policy recommendations
There are several potentially policy-relevant implications
from our findings in this paper. We chose to focus our
discussion on two areas that we believe to be particularly
important: (1) the burden on consumers from having to
consider reenrollment decisions every year, and (2) the
pattern of rising premiums. For each, we explore ideas for
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policy initiatives that aim to increase to the long-term sta-
bility of the Marketplace.
Annual reenrollment and consumer burden
Our findings point to an increased likelihood that con-
sumers, particularly those who are price sensitive, would be
compelled to comparison-shop each year to find the most
affordable health plan. However, navigating the health care
system to figure out which plan is most suitable, not an
easy task for anyone, is likely to be that much more difficult
for people who previously were uninsured. In a study in-
volving individuals most likely to use the marketplaces, ap-
proximately two thirds of those surveyed reported gaps in
their understanding of key health insurance concepts, such
as deductibles, co-payments, premiums, coinsurance and
provider networks; this knowledge gap was particularly
high for those in the Marketplaces’ target population who
were under 30, not working, in racial/ethnic minority
groups, and who had incomes between 138 and 400% of
the FPL (i.e. those eligible for subsidies) [31]. While per-
sonal assistance with the application and enrollment
process is available, the effort and resources to provide help
will only increase as more individuals enroll in the Market-
place. Providing enrollees with tailored educational mate-
rials pertaining to their plan is one potentially low-cost way
to decrease the burden of having to choose the best plan
each year. Further, information about consumer preferences
related to health insurance could be collected using the on-
line system for enrollment, and then used to create targeted
information about which plans might be most suitable for
consumers’ particular healthcare needs each year.
Rising premiums and insurance risk pools
Premiums that continue to increase over time pose a
real threat to the long-term stability of the Marketplace,
both related to retention and the ability to attract new
enrollees. Insurers being unfamiliar with the needs of
the Marketplace enrollees is one likely reason for the
rise in premiums over the first 3 years [20, 32].
An unexpectedly high proportion of older, sicker con-
sumers purchasing insurance in the Marketplace is another
likely explanation for rising premiums. The current subsidy
design makes it less expensive for older adults to purchase
plans cheaper than the benchmark plan compared to youn-
ger adults [7, 8]. As a result, insurance risk pools may be
skewed in the direction of a larger than expected propor-
tion of older adults with higher healthcare needs, which
then subsequently perpetuates the need for higher pre-
miums and instability in the Marketplace. More expensive
premiums may inhibit the willingness of younger adults to
purchase insurance, who may instead choose to pay the
penalty. The current political uncertainty about enforce-
ment of the mandate and whether the subsidies will be
maintained may further discourage healthier adults from
enrolling. Adjusting the subsidy design to make purchasing
insurance more attractive to younger adults is one clear
way to combat the trend in rising premiums.
Limitations
While four plan metal tiers are offered in the Marketplace,
we focused our analysis on the lowest-cost silver and
bronze plans. The majority of Marketplace consumers have
enrolled in silver plans in each of the 3 years; additionally,
there is evidence that most enrollees tend to migrate to the
cheaper silver plans (i.e. the lowest and second-lowest cost
plans) [33, 34]. Further, given the similarity of changes in
silver plan premiums to the changes observed for plans
overall [19], we might expect the general trends to be simi-
lar for other metal levels. Our results from analyzing
changes to the lowest-cost bronze plans suggest this to be
the case; we observed a similar trend upward in the propor-
tion of counties where plans were no longer the cheapest
(50.8 and 63.8% of counties in 2015 and 2016, respectively),
and in only 11.9% of counties did the lowest-cost bronze
plan remain the cheapest option all 3 years.
We also could not determine if individuals actually
switched plans if their lowest-cost silver plan from the pre-
vious year was no longer the cheapest, due to limitations of
the data. Instead, we determined the implications for the
three potential scenarios that consumers could face upon
reenrollment, in which they would have to make a choice
either to stay in the same plan or switch to a new plan, and
discussed the potential influence of several factors. There is
evidence for substantial inertia in health insurance plan
choices in general [35–40]; however, data from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation does indicate considerable plan switching
in both 2015 and 2016, at least at the state-level [12,
13]. Policymakers would benefit from future research
that looks at whether actual switching at the individ-
ual level took place. It may also be beneficial to put
the findings from this paper into a context with other
types of markets (such as health insurance systems in
European countries). Finally, because we did not have data
to link state-facilitated marketplace plans between time
periods, we were unable include them in our analysis.
Conclusion
While ACA policy initiatives have shown promise in
providing health insurance coverage for individuals who
previously would not have been able to access or afford
care, continued changes in health plan features and
affordability will making staying in the same plan
year-after-year costly for many. High plan switching and
churning could have negative ramifications going for-
ward. Future healthcare policy should aim to stabilize
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the Marketplace by making sure the mandate to pur-
chase health insurance is enforced, by decreasing the
burden to consumers of having to consider reenrollment
every year (e.g. by providing targeted educational mate-
rials), and by changing the current subsidy design to en-
courage greater enrollment of younger, healthier adults.
Appendix
Table 4 Changes to lowest-cost bronze plan features: “Stay
Only” and “Switch Only”
2014–2015 2015–2016 2014–2016
Stay Only N = 1100
(43.8%)
N = 784
(31.2%)
N = 300
(11.9%)
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
9.4% 16.5% 26.4%
Counties with Premium
Increase (%)
89.5% 98.5% 92.7%
Counties with Premium
Decrease (%)
10.5% 1.5% 7.3%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
-$25.14 $178.64 $197.83
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
−0.4% 3.4% 3.5%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with No
Change (%)
99.2%† 82.3%†† 39.7%
2014-2015 2015–2016 2014–2016
Switch Only N = 136
(5.4%)
N = 126
(5.0%)
N = 334
(13.3%)
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
21.2% 23.1% 30.5%
Counties with Premium
Increase (%)
95.6% 100.0% 100.0%
Counties with Premium
Decrease (%)
4.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change ($)
$1408.46 $361.90 $665.42
Avg. Year-Over-Year
Change (%)
31.5% 10.0% 15.9%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with No
Change (%)
1.5% 0.0% 0.01%
†For those who stay in the 2014 plan, the % of counties that did not retain the
same issuer and plan type is due to HealthSpan Integrated Care taking over
coverage from Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Ohio in seven Ohio counties
††For those who stay in the 2015 plan, the % of counties that did not retain
the same issuer and plan type is due to Aetna Health Inc. acquiring Coventry
Health Care Inc. in counties in Iowa (99), North Carolina (24), South Carolina (1)
and Georgia (21). Members did not experience significant changes in care, and
all provider locations remained open after the change. The issuer and plan
type serve as a proxy for provider network
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Table 5 Changes to lowest-cost bronze plan features: “Choice to Stay” vs. “Choice to Switch”
2014–2015
N = 1275 (50.8%)
2015–2016
N = 1602 (63.8%)
2014–2016
N = 1877 (74.8%)
Choice to Stay Choice
to Switch
Choice
to Stay
Choice
to Switch
Choice
to Stay
Choice
to Switch
Premiums
Avg. Year-Over-
Year Change (%)
9.3% −0.2% 23.7% 15.5% 33.5% 20.3%
Counties with
Premium
Increase (%)
90.7% 55.5% 99.4% 90.3% 97.2% 85.9%
Counties with
Premium
Decrease (%)
9.3% 44.5% 0.6% 9.7% 2.8% 14.1%
Medical Deductible
Avg. Year-Over-
Year Change ($)
-$0.98 $353.49 $163.62 $213.05 $132.01 $457.88
Avg. Year-Over-
Year Change (%)
0.1% 8.6% 3.4% 6.2% 2.9% 11.3%
Issuer/Plan Type
Counties with
No Change (%)
98.7% 20.0% 95.3% 44.4% 32.9% 11.9%
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Table 6 Changes in after-subsidy premiums for lowest-cost bronze plans
With Subsidy at 300% FPL
2014–2015 2015–2016
Change in Premium Cost of Stayinga Change in Premium Cost of Stayinga
Stay Switch Difference Stay Switch Difference
Remained Lowest-Cost N = 1100 counties N = 784 counties
27-year-old $13.30 $0.00 $19.71 $0.00
50-year-old $4.14 $0.00 $2.36 $0.00
60-year-old $4.11 $0.00 $3.99 $0.00
No Longer Lowest-Cost N = 1275 counties N = 1602 counties
27-year-old $16.75 -$0.74 $17.49 $36.09 $20.79 $15.30
50-year-old $35.22 $5.64 $29.58 $30.27 $4.22 $26.05
60-year-old $50.81 $6.07 $44.74 $45.88 $6.47 $39.41
Discontinued N = 136 counties N = 126 counties
27-year-old $33.61 No Coverage $31.23 No Coverage
50-year-old -$34.38 No Coverage -$11.24 No Coverage
60-year-old -$53.35 No Coverage -$19.68 No Coverage
No Subsidy at > 400% FPL
2014–2015 2015–2016
Change in Premium Cost of Staying Change in Premium Cost of Staying
Stay Switch Difference Stay Switch Difference
Remained Lowest-Cost N = 1100 counties N = 784 counties
27-year-old $13.86 $0.00 $29.05 $0.00
50-year-old $23.58 $0.00 $49.37 $0.00
60-year-old $35.81 $0.00 $74.90 $0.00
No Longer Lowest-Cost N = 1275 counties N = 1602 counties
27-year-old $15.35 -$2.14 $17.49 $42.95 $27.65 $15.30
50-year-old $25.93 -$3.65 $29.58 $73.08 $47.04 $26.04
60-year-old $39.20 -$5.54 $44.74 $110.96 $71.42 $39.54
Discontinued N = 136 counties N = 126 counties
27-year-old $33.33 No Coverage $38.10 No Coverage
50-year-old $56.81 No Coverage $64.43 No Coverage
60-year-old $86.32 No Coverage $97.42 No Coverage
aPremium levels shown for nonusers of tobacco only. Cost of staying is the difference in the change in monthly after-subsidy bronze premium between the linked
plan and the lowest-cost option. For those who switched, both the bronze plans were lowest-cost. For those who stayed, only the 2014 or 2015 bronze plan was
lowest-cost. Finally, in counties where the bronze plan was discontinued, if enrollees did not actively select a new plan, they would no longer have coverage. Cal-
culations were the same between 2015 and 2016
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